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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MONICA GILLETT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

]
CASE NO. 880413-CA

V•

t

JAMES ANTHONY GILLETT,

|

Defendant/Appellant.

PRIORITY NO. 146

]

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(h).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff, a New York resident, filed an action in Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah to enforce the terms of a
non-judicial Separation Agreement entered into by the parties in
1970 and amended by the parties in 1977.

This appeal stems from

the trial court granting Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
of the trial court's earlier denial of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment pursuant to the Motion for Reconsideration.
DETERMINATIVE STATUES
There

are

no

determinative

provisions or ordinances.

statutes,

constitutional

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Monica Gillett

("Ms.

Gillett"),

and Defendant/Appellant, James Anthony Gillett ("Dr.

Gillett"),

were married on May 7, 1938 in Banstead, England.

There were

four children as issue of the marriage. (R: pg 13)

Dr. Gillett

is a medical doctor.

His career led the parties to live in

Australia during a portion of the marriage, and to change their
residences

frequently

impossible

for

Ms.

marriage.

Additionally,

throughout

Gillett

to

the

pursue

marriage,
a

career

making

it

during

the

Dr. Gillettfs medical career limited

the time which he spent with his children, leaving Ms. Gillett
with the full responsibility to provide a home for the family.
After

thirty-two

psychiatrist,

became

years

of

romantically

marriage,
involved

Dr.
with

Gillett,
one

of

a
his

patients and wished to divorce his wife in order to marry his
patient.

(R: pg 75-76)

Ms. Gillett, without any marketable

skills, and with no work experience, feared that Dr. Gillett
would lose his medical license if his involvement with a patient
became

public

knowledge.

Accordingly,

when

Dr.

Gillett

approached her with a demand for a Mexican divorce, to circumvent
the year-long waiting period then required by New York law, Ms.
Gillett agreed.
Separation

She never consulted counsel before signing a

Agreement

dated

March

31, 1970; neither

did

she

consult an attorney before agreeing that Dr. Gillett could take a
Mexican divorce against her. (R: pg. 75-76)

On March 31, 1970, the parties entered into a Separation
Agreement, which was drafted by Dr. Gillettfs counsel, and which
was not reviewed by anyone representing Ms. Gillett!s interests.
(R: pg 13-17, 75-76)

Both parties were residents of Fulton, New

York when the original Separation Agreement was signed, and both
signed

it

in Oswego, New York.

(R: pg

17)

The Separation

Agreement provided, in pertinent parts:
1.

Dr. Gillett shall pay Ms. Gillett $650 a month, payable
on the first day of each month, and shall, in addition,
pay the monthly rental on Ms. Gillettfs residence.

2.

Dr. Gillett shall continue the life insurance policies
on

his

own

life, shall pay the premiums

on those

policies and shall continue to maintain Ms. Gillett as
beneficiary on those polices.
3.

Should the parties divorce, the Separation Agreement
should not be merged into the Decree of Divorce, but
should survive the Decree, and "be forever binding and
conclusive on the parties,...11 (R: pg 15-16)

The parties were divorced in Juarez, Mexico on April 28,
1970.

The Separation Agreement was incorporated into the Decree

of Divorce, but was not merged with it. (R: pg 11-12)
Dr. Gillett fell into arrears in his support obligations for
the period January 1, 1973 to July 1, 1975, forcing Ms. Gillett
to bring an action against him in the Supreme Court, Onondaga
County, State of New York on or about July 22, 1975. (R: pg 1819)

In settlement of that action, the parties, though their

counsel,
September

amended
20,

the

1911.

Separation

Agreement

Subsequently,

the

in

open

parties

court

on

executed

an

Amended Separation Agreement dated September 23, 1977, in which
they modified the fifth paragraph of the Separation Agreement to
fix Dr. Gillett!s support obligation at $800 each month.

In the

Amended Separation Agreement, the parties "reiterate, reallege
and reaffirm all the agreements as previously set out in the
Separation Agreement dated the 31st day of March, 1970."

The

Amended Separation Agreement did not provide that the Decree of
Divorce be modified in accordance with its provisions. (R: pg 1819)

The Decree remains unaltered.

Neither

the

Decree

of

Divorce, the Separation Agreement, nor the Amended Separation
Agreement was ever incorporated into a judgment or order of an
American court.
Dr.

Gillett

made

support

payments

to

Ms.

Gillett

in

accordance with the Amended Separation Agreement for eight years.
Then, in May 1985, Dr. Gillett decreased his payment from the
agreed-upon $800 each month to $400.

He paid $540 in June, $800

in July, and from August 1985 through August 1986, paid $650 a
month in support. (R: pg 21-22, 53-54)

After Ms. Gillett filed

this action to recover the arrearages owed her in late August
1986, Dr. Gillett refused to make any payments to her. (R: pg
126-127)
Dr. Gillett has never argued that the Amended Separation
Agreement provides justification

for his refusal to make the

required payments to Ms. Gillett.

Neither has he suggested that

there

is

a

change

in

his

circumstances

which

renders

it

difficult, impossible, or unjust for him to continue the payments
to Ms. Gillett.

Certainly, Dr. Gillett has not availed himself

of his opportunity under New York law to attempt to have his
support obligation reduced.
had

paid

enough,

and

Apparently, he just decided that he

that he would

relieve himself

of the

obligation to continue to support the woman who had been his wife
for thirty-two years, and who had borne him four children.
When nonjudicial attempts to convince Dr. Gillett to resume
full payments under the Amended Separation Agreement failed, Ms.
Gillett filled an action in the Third District Court seeking a
judgment for the amount of arrearages and an order of specific
performance of the Amended Separation Agreement. (R: pg 2-22)

On

November 21, 1986, Ms. Gillett moved for summary judgment. (R: pg
29, 31-56)

While Dr. Gillett never filed a responsive pleading,

he did have a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment delivered to Ms. Gillett!s counsel shortly before the
scheduled

hearing

on the Motion.

On October

31, 1988, Dr.

Gillett had his Memorandum in Opposition inserted into the Record
of this case. (R: No page numbers, located at end of Volume I of
the Record)
The

Court

heard

December 15, 1986.

arguments

on

Ms.

Gillettfs

Motion

on

During the course of oral argument, counsel

for Ms. Gillett erroneously informed the Court that her client
had been represented by counsel when the Separation Agreement was
negotiated and drafted. (Trans: pg 10)

After hearing argument, the Court ruled in a Minute Entry
dated

December

ambiguity

in

17, 1986, that
the

agreement

"There

concerning

does

appear

the

obligation to pay plaintiff..." (R: pg 59)

to be an

duration

of

the

The Court's Order

denying Ms. Gillett's Motion for Summary Judgment was entered
January 20, 1987. (R: pg 60-61)
During much of 1987, the parties attempted to negotiate a
settlement of the controversy.

Ms. Gillett propounded discovery

to Dr. Gillett, which was never answered. (R: pg 99)
On October 19, 1987, Ms. Gillett sought a reconsideration of
the Court's earlier denial of her Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R: pg 71-76)

Counsel had learned that Ms. Gillett had not been

represented by counsel at the time that the Separation Agreement
was negotiated, drafted, and signed.

Counsel was informed that

Ms. Gillett had been terrified at the time of the divorce that
Dr. Gillett's involvement with his patient would become public
knowledge,

and

that

practice medicine.

Dr.

Gillett

would

lose

his

license

to

Counsel discovered that Ms. Gillett wished

only to have the divorce taken as quietly as possible to protect
herself and her two college-age children who were dependent upon
Dr. Gillett for support.
Knowing that ambiguities are to be interpreted against the
party drafting a contract, Ms. Gillett's counsel believed that
the

Court had been

misled during oral argument by her assertion

that

Ms.

Gillett

had

been

represented

Separation Agreement was drafted.

by

counsel

when

the

Therefore, counsel determined

to seek the Court's reconsideration of its earlier decision.
Ms. Gillett filed her Motion to Reconsider on October 19,
1987.

The Motion was heard on November 30, 1987, and was taken

under advisement.

On December 1, 1987, the Court held in its

Minute Entry that:
"upon review of the file and supporting
affidavits the Court determines that it did
in fact err in denying Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
A re-reading of the
Separation Agreement convinces the Court that
no ambiguity exists..."
(R: pg 101)
(Emphasis added)
Accordingly, the Court reversed its earlier ruling, and granted
Ms. Gillett's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court mailed its Minute Entry to counsel on December 10,
1987.

Ms. Gillett submitted her proposed Judgment and Order on

December

18, 1987, which Judgment and Order were signed and

entered by the Court on December 29, 1987. (R: pg 117-118)
Prior to her submission of the proposed Judgment and Order,
counsel for Ms. Gillett telephoned counsel for Dr. Gillett, and
asked him to contact her if he believed that she had made a
computational error in determining the amount of arrearages owed
by his client.
concerning

the

Counsel never contacted Ms. Gillett's counsel
calculation

of

arrearages.

(R:

pg

12 3-124)

Rather, Dr. Gillett filed an Objection to the Proposed Findings
and Order and Motion for Amendment of Judgment or Relief from the
Order on December 23, 1987. (R: pg 103-116)

In his Motion for

Amendment or Relief, Dr. Gillett for the first time raised the
defense that he had made payments to Ms. Gillett in 1970-1973 in
addition to those required under the Separation Agreement, and
that he was entitled to credit for those payments.
The Court heard argument on Dr. Gillett!s Objection and
Motion, and denied both. (R: pg 140)

The Court gave Ms. Gillett

leave to file an Amended Judgment and Order, which was signed and
entered by the Court on May 16, 1988. (R: pg 143-144)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

While Ms. Gillett concedes that the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure do not specifically provide for a Motion to Reconsider,
the Court may change a ruling until a final judgment on the case
is rendered.
2.

The Separation Agreement and the Amended

Separation

Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with New York law, in
that the parties entered into the Separation Agreement in New
York State, stipulated in a New York Court to the modifications
set

forth

in

the

Amended

Separation

Agreement,

and

the

beneficiary of the Separation Agreement has at all times remained
a resident of New York State, providing New York with the most
substantial interest in the contract.

Nevertheless, since Utah

law and New York law are substantially similar with respect to
the legal issues here presented, the Court's decision would be
the same whether New York or Utah law applies.
3.

There was no ambiguity in the Separation Agreement or

Amended Separation Agreement under either New York or Utah law.

4.

Under

New

York

law,

the

Separation

Agreement

and

Amended Separation Agreement are enforceable, and cannot be set
aside unless unconscionable.

The facts on the record do not

demonstrate that these Agreements were unconscionable at the time
they

were

executed,

nor

that

enforcement

now would

work a

hardship on Dr. Gillett.
5.

Dr. Gillett has failed to justify his failure to pay

alimony to Ms. Gillett by any interpretation of the so-called
"ambiguous" portions of the Separation Agreement.
6.

Dr. Gillett

is not

entitled

to

credit

against his

arrearages for payments he allegedly made to Ms. Gillett in 1970
through 1973.
7.

Dr. Gillett has appealed the decision of the trial

court only to delay, and has failed to raise any valid legal
claims.

Accordingly, Ms. Gillett should be awarded her fees and

costs.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I.

WHEN THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT IT ERRED, IT MAY
CHANGE ITS RULING UNTIL A FINAL JUDGMENT IS ENTERED.

Dr. Gillett argues that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do
not provide for a Motion to Reconsider.

Ms. Gillett concedes

that Dr. Gillett is correct that the Rules do not explicitly
identify

such a

procedure.

Neither do the

Rules

identify a

Motion for Extension of Time, Motion for Leave to Withdraw, or
any of the other Motions which attorneys propound on behalf of
their clients each day.
The denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment is interlocutory
in nature; it cannot be appealed.

See, for example, All Weather

Insulation, Inc. v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 1177
(Utah 1985); Marathon Steel Company v. Placers, Inc., 692 P.2d
765, 768 (Utah 1985); Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918, 919 (Utah
1979) .
mind

Under Utah law, "any judge is free to change his or her

on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally

rendered."

Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757,760 (Utah 1985).

As

a general rule, courts do follow "the law of the case", to avoid
delay.

But the doctrine of the "law of the case" exists to serve

"the interests of economy of time and efficiency of procedure..."
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977).
In this case, the Court, "convinced" that "it did in fact
err in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment," served
the interest of judicial economy by reversing itself.

Believing

that there was no issue of material fact existing, the Court
could not justify holding a trial to hear testimony which could
have no relevance to its decision.

For the Court of Appeals to

compel a trial judge to try a case for no purpose is absurd, and
a waste of the judicial resources of the State of Utah.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the Utah Rules,
do not explicitly provide for a Motion to Reconsider, yet the
federal courts may, either upon motion or sua sponte, reconsider
10

denials of a summary judgment at any time.

See, for example,

Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation, 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.
1979) ; Warner Brothers v. American Broadcasting Company, Inc. ,
720 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1983).

In this case, after the Court

learned that Ms. Gillett was not represented by counsel at the
time she executed the Separation Agreement, and after review of
the

relevant

law

of

both

New

York

State

and

Utah,

which

terminates the obligation for the payment of alimony upon the
death of either party or the remarriage of the payee, the Court
determined that it had erred.
such

errors

precedence.

when

given

new

It must be permitted to correct
information

or

additional

legal

Any other rule would unacceptably limit a trial

court's discretion.
In addition, it is clear that Rules 54(b), 59 and 60 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit a Court, under certain
circumstances,

to

"reconsider"

its

earlier

decision,

reverse it, even after a final order has been entered.

and

to

It is

illogical to deny the Court the right to do the same thing when
an order

is interlocutory

in nature and those Rules are not

applicable.
II.

THE COURT MUST APPLY NEW YORK LAW IN INTERPRETING THE
SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND ITS AMENDMENTS.

Dr. Gillett claims that Utah law, not New York law, governs
the

interpretation

of

Separation Agreement.

the

Separation

Agreement

He is absolutely wrong.

and

Amended

Utah courts apply

the lex loci contractus rule, and look to the law of the place of
making the contract in interpreting it.

Chevron Chemical Co. v.

Mecham, 536 F.Supp. 1036, 1040 (D. Utah 1982).
Separation Agreement was made

and executed

In this case, the
in New York.

The

parties stipulated to the Amended Separation Agreement in a New
York Court.

Ms. Gillett

executed

that document

which Dr. Gillett executed it in Washington.

in New York,

Clearly, under Utah

choice of law principles, New York law governs the Agreements.
However, even if the Court were to adopt the position set
forth in Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws, it would reach the
same result.

Section 188 states that the rights and duties of

the parties are determined by the local law of the state with the
most significant relationship to the transaction, and the Courts
should consider the following in identifying that state:
(a)
(b)

place of contracting
place of negotiation

(c)

place of performance

In this case, the Agreements were negotiated and made in New
York.

The

real

property

which

the

Separation

distributed was located in New York State.

Agreement

The purpose of the

alimony provision of the Agreements, to provide Ms. Gillett with
a

dependable

charge.

income

and

to

keep

her

from

becoming

a

public

Indeed, if Ms. Gillett were to become a public charge,

it is New York taxpayers who would have to support her.
Court therefore should apply New York law.

The

However, even if the Court were to apply Utah law, the
result

would

be

the

same.

New

York

and

Utah

law

are

substantially identical with respect to the matters at issue.
III. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
AMBIGUITY IN THE AMENDED SEPARATION AGREEMENT.
Dr. Gillett has argued that The Separation Agreement and
Amended Separation Agreement are ambiguous, in that neither sets
forth

specific

duration

support to Ms. Gillett.

for Dr. Gillett's

obligation

to pay

Dr. Gillett is in error for numerous

reasons.
The

language

of

the

Separation

Agreement,

which

was

reaffirmed in the Amended Separation Agreement, states that:
"the parties hereto agree that they shall be
bound by all the terms of this agreement and
that this agreement shall not be merged in
any decree or judgment that may be granted in
such (divorce) action but shall survive the
same and shall be forever binding and
conclusive on the parties..." (R: pg 15-16)
The Agreements do not state that they are binding on either
parties1 heirs, assigns, and the like.

It is obvious from the

language of the documents that they are to terminate upon the
death of either party.
Further demonstrating the fact that the Separation Agreement
was designed to provide support for Ms. Gillett for the duration
of her life,

without charge to Dr. Gillett's estate, is the fact

that Dr. Gillett is required under the terms of the Separation
Agreement to continue Ms. Gillett as beneficiary of his life
insurance policies.
Under both New York and Utah law, ambiguity in a contract is
not established simply because the parties disagree about the
meaning of the contract.
ascertained,
itself.

if

The intent of the parties is to be

possible,

from

the

content

of

the

document

Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A.,

570 F.Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d
1060 (Utah 1981).

Here, both the language and the provisions of

the Agreements spell out the intent of both parties at the time
the documents were executed.

Both parties agreed to a scheme

that would provide Ms. Gillett, nearly fifty-five years old and
without

employment

experience

or skills, with

some

financial

security for the remainder of her life, unless she remarried.
Even if the Agreements themselves did not clearly spell out
the duration of Dr. Gillett1s support obligation, both New York
and

Utah

terminates

law

provide

upon

recipient spouse.

death

that

the

obligation

of either party

or

to

pay

remarriage

alimony
of the

Cohen v. Cronin, 382 N.Y.S.2d 724,726 (1976)

("well-accepted proposition that husband's obligation to support
terminates with death11); Perry v. Perry, 444 N.Y.S.2d 490,491
(App.Div.3rd Dept. 1981); Chiarmonte v. Chiarmonte, 435 N.Y.S.2d
523

(S.Ct., Nassau Co. 1981); In the Estate of Donahue, 357

N.Y.S.2d 777,782 (Sur.Ct.N.Y.Co. 1974); Gandelman v. Gandelman,
331 N.Y.S.2d 977 (App.Div.2d Dept. 1972); Ehrler v. Ehrler, 328

N.Y.S.2d

728

(S.Ct.,

Nassau

Co.

1972);

New

York

Domestic

Relations Law, Section 236B(1)(a); Utah Code Annotated, Section
30-3-5(5).
Even assuming that the Agreements were ambiguous, and that
the law did not "fill in the blanks", the Court was still correct
in granting summary judgment for Ms. Gillett.

Under both New

York and Utah law, a contract should be construed against its
maker.

This rule of contract interpretation is particularly

persuasive when, as in this situation, the other party was not
represented by counsel. Jacobsen v. Sassower, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381
(1985); Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652
P.2d 918 (Utah 1982).
Finally, even if the Agreements were ambiguous, and even if
that alleged

ambiguity were not to be construed

against Dr.

Gillett, Dr. Gillett is barred from claiming a defect in the
Agreements.
agreement

Under
may

collaterally
bilateral

not

after

New

York

attack
it

has

law,
the

been

"a party
validity

to a

of

incorporated

the
into

separation
agreement
a

valid,

foreign decree of divorce." Galvn v. Schwartz, 453

N.Y.S.2d 624 (1982).

Here, while the Separation Agreement was

not merged with the Decree of Divorce, it was incorporated into
it, just as the parties agreed it might be.

(R: pg 11, 16)

Therefore, Dr. Gillett is bound by its clear provisions, that he
is to pay Ms. Gillett $800 each month until either party dies or
she remarries.

IV.

THE SEPARATION AGREEMENTS WERE NEITHER UNCONSCIONABLE,
NOR VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY, AND THEY SHOULD BE
ENFORCED.

Dr.

Gillett

apparently

is

claiming

that

the

Separation

Agreement, into which he entered with the advice of counsel, and
for the purpose of enabling him to obtain a "quickie" Mexican
divorce from his wife of thirty-two years, was unconscionable at
the time he entered into it.
the facts on the record.

His claim is unbelievable, given

At the time of the divorce, Dr. Gillett

was a successful medical doctor, who wished to marry a younger
woman, while Ms. Gillett was, by the doctor's own admission, a
fifty-five year old woman without marketable skills.
Amazingly, Dr. Gillett cites Christian v. Christian, 365
N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1977) to support his position.
all

That case, in

its particulars, supports Ms. Gillett1s position in this

action.

New

York's

highest

court

held

in

Christian

that

"generally, separation agreements which are regular on their face
are binding on the parties unless and until they are put aside."
3 65 N.E.2d at 855.
not void. Id.

At most, separation agreements are voidable.

Here, neither the Separation Agreement nor the

Amended Separation Agreement has been put aside, and Dr. Gillett
is bound by them.

Dr. Gillett unilaterally decided to reduce,

and then terminate, payments to Ms. Gillett without seeking the
permission of the Court to do so.

Further, the Court in Christian stated:
"Judicial review is to be exercised circumspectly,
sparingly and with a persisting view to the
encouragement of parties settling their own
differences...
Furthermore, when there has been
full disclosure between the parties...and there
has been an absence of inequitable conduct or
other infirmity... courts should not intrude so as
to redesign the bargain arrived at by the
parties..." Id.
The Court set forth the circumstances under which it would refuse
to enforce a Separation Agreement as follows:
"To warrant equity's intervention, no actual fraud
need be shown, for relief will be granted if the
settlement is manifestly unfair to a spouse
because of the other's overreaching.
In
determining whether a separation agreement is
invalid, courts may look at the terms of the
agreement to see if there is an inference, or even
a negative inference, of overreaching in its
execution.
If the execution of the agreement,
however, be fair, no further inquiry will be
made." 365 N.E.2d at 856.
In this case, Dr. Gillett has alleged no facts which would
indicate that Ms. Gillett overreached at the time the Separation
Agreement was executed.

The facts are quite to the contrary.

Dr. Gillett was represented by counsel, while Ms. Gillett was
without the assistance of counsel.

Dr. Gillett was economically

strong and independent, while Ms. Gillett was without job skills
or work experience.

If there was any overreaching here, it was

done by Dr. Gillett, not Ms. Gillett.

The Agreements should be

enforced.
The provisions of the Separation Agreement similarly do not
violate Utah public policy.

A women married to a successful

medical doctor for thirty-two years, who was without marketable

skills

at

the

time

of

the

divorce would

permanent alimony in Utah, even today.

likely

be

awarded

See, for example, Rasband

v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988).
V.

EVEN IF THE AGREEMENTS WERE AMBIGUOUS AS TO DURATION,
APPELLANT HAS PROVIDED NO REASON FOR HIS REFUSAL TO
SUPPORT RESPONDENT OTHER THAN A DISINCLINATION TO DO
SO.

Dr. Gillett argues that the Separation Agreement and the
Amended Separation Agreement are ambiguous, in that they don't
set forth a specific duration for his obligation to pay alimony
to his former wife.

Under the law, absent an agireement to the

contrary, Dr. Gillett1s obligation continues until either party
dies, Ms. Gillett remarries, or the Court relieves him of the
future obligation to pay support.
cause

for

a

failure to

seek

Unless Dr. Gillett shows good

invalidation

of the

Separation

Agreement or modification of it, there can be no retroactive
reduction of alimony.

Benjamin v. Benjamin, 417 N.Y.S.2d 479,

481 (App.Div.lst Dept. 1979); Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077,
1079 (Utah 1977).
Here, Dr. Gillett has never alleged any reason for failing
to seek the Court's assistance.
his alimony payments.
the

Court,

he

He merely decided to decrease

When Ms. Gillett sought the assistance of

punished

her

by

stopping

payment

altogether,

perhaps hoping that she would be unable to afford to assert her
rights to alimony.

The Court of Appeals should not permit Dr.
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Gillett to continue to deprive Ms. Gillett, now seventy-two years
old, of the support to which she is entitled and on which she has
depended to enable her to avoid a poverty-stricken old age.
VI.

APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR SUMS ALLEGEDLY
PAID TO RESPONDENT IN LIEU OF ALIMONY.

Dr. Gillett claimed, for the first time, in his Motion for
Amendment of Judgment or Relief from Order that he had made
payments to Ms. Gillett in addition to the support payments under
the

Separation

Agreements.

It

is undisputed

"additional" payments were made between

that any

1970 and

such

1973.

Dr.

Gillett first mentioned them fifteen years later, in 1988.

Even

if such payments were made, which Ms. Gillett disputes, Dr.
Gillett

is not

entitled

to

an

offset

as

a matter

of law.

Accordingly, there is no material facts in dispute concerning the
amount owed by Dr. Gillett to Ms. Gillett.
Both Utah and New York law are clear that such payments, if
they occurred, may not be credited against other amounts due and
owing under a separation agreement or decree of divorce.

Soltow

v. Soltow, 364 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (App.Div.2d Dept. 1975); H o m e v.
H o m e , 292 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (1968) ("The general rule (is) that
payments made 'voluntarily and not pursuant to a divorce decree
may

not

be

owing....1).
1979) .

credited

by

him

against

other

amounts

due and

See also Ross v. Ross, 592 P. 2d 600, 603 (Utah

Such claims are barred by laches.

Under New York law,

alimony and support payments may be recovered for only six years.
Tauber v. Lebow, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1985); Galvn v. Schwartz, 434
N.Y.S.2d

1,3

(App.Div.lst

Dept. 1980).

Annotated, Section 78-12-23.

See

also Utah

Code

Dr. Gillett failed to make alimony

payments to Ms. Gillett under the Separation Agreement in 1970,
which payments she has never sought.

(R: pg 127)

Ms. Gillett

cannot now seek an offset against any payments Dr. Gillett may
have made

on her behalf

in 1970-1973.

Accordingly,

equity

forbids the Court from permitting Dr. Gillett to claim credit for
his payments, if he indeed made them.
Further, the parties litigated the issue of arrearages in an
action brought in 1975 in a New York court.

If Dr. Gillett

failed to raise a claim of offset in those proceedings, he is
barred from doing so now.

If the question was raised at that

time and he was then granted such offset, he may not claim it
again.
Finally,

even

if

there

is

a

dispute

as

to

amount

of

arrearages, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
that Dr. Gillett has a continuing obligation to pay alimony, and
remand for further hearings on the amount presently owed.

VII. APPELLANT BROUGHT THIS APPEAL ONLY TO DELAY PAYMENT OF
THE SUMS AWARDED RESPONDENT, AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE
AWARDED THE FEES AND COSTS SHE INCURRED IN RESPONDING
TO IT.
Dr. Gillett has never pointed to a single statement in the
Separation Agreement, Amended Separation Agreement, or Decree of
Divorce which, under any reading, justifies his reduction or
termination of alimony payments to Ms. Gillett.

Yet, for nearly

two and one half years, Dr. Gillett has delayed the inevitable,
and increased Ms. Gillett1s costs by filing Memoranda and appeals
with the most minimal legal basis.

Under Rule 33(a) of the Rules

of

this

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals,

damages", and single or double costs.

Court

may

award

"just

Ms. Gillett asks that she

be awarded the attorneys' fees and costs she incurred since the
inception of this action as damages, and be granted double her
fees and costs in defending this appeal.
Under New York law, she would be entitled to the fees and
costs she incurred in enforcing this Separation Agreement, Galyn
v. Schwartz, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 4.

The Utah courts should do no

less, particularly since she would likely recover these fees and
costs if she were collecting arrearages under a Decree of Divorce
rather than in a breach of contract action.

CONCLUSION
Respondent, Monica Gillett, respectfully asks that the Utah
Court of Appeals:
1.

Affirm the decision of the Third District Court, that
Appellant, James Anthony Gillett, is bound by the clear
provisions of the Amended

Separation Agreement, and

must pay alimony in the amount of $800 each month until
the death of either party or remarriage of Ms. Gillett.
2.

Award Ms. Gillett all arrearages accrued to the time of
the decision of the Court of Appeals on this matter,
including interest, and either enter a Judgment in that
amount or remand to the Third District Court with an
order that it enter such a Judgment.

3.

Enter a Order for specific performance of the Amended
Separation Agreement, or remand to the Third District
Court with instructions that it enter such an Order.

4.

Award as damages to Ms. Gillett all fees and costs
incurred by her since the inception of this action.

5.

Award Ms. Gillett double the fees and costs incurred in
defending against Dr. Gillettfs appeal.

6.

Such

other

remedies

as

this

Court

finds

just

and

reasonable.
DATED this

of January, 1989.
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Louise T. Knauer
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing was mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid,
on this

/;' day of January, 1989, to the following:
Elliott Levine, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
4168 South 1785 West

West Valley City, Utah 84119
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